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ABSTRACT 34 
 35 
Patients with schizophrenia show reduced cooperation and less sensitivity to social cues in 36 
pairwise interactions, however, it remains unclear whether these mechanisms are also present 37 
in interactions within social groups. We used a public goods game to investigate cooperation and 38 
sensitivity to social feedback in group interactions in 27 patients with schizophrenia and 27 39 
healthy controls. Participants played 40 trials in two conditions: 1) no fine (20 trials): participants 40 
had the choice of investing into the public good (i.e. cooperating) or not (i.e. defecting), 2) fine 41 
(20 trials): participants had the same choice but defectors could be punished by the other players. 42 
On the first trial, patients invested less in the public good than healthy controls. In the no fine 43 
condition, controls decreased their investments over time, but patients did not. The possibility 44 
of being fined for defecting and actually being fined led to significantly higher cooperation in both 45 
groups. This shows that the groups were equally sensitive to social enforcement and social 46 
feedback. Our findings suggest that patients tend to approach social group interactions with less 47 
cooperative behaviour, which could contribute to social dysfunction in daily-life. However, an 48 
intact sensitivity to social enforcement and feedback indicates that patients can adjust their 49 
behaviour accordingly in group interactions. 50 
 51 
1. Introduction 52 
 53 
Social cognitive skills are crucial for the development of cooperation and trust in interpersonal 54 
relationships (Fett et al., 2014; Kishida et al., 2010; Sutter and Kocher, 2007). There is ample 55 
evidence that patients with schizophrenia demonstrate impairments in social cognition (Couture 56 
et al., 2006; Fett et al., 2011; Green and Leitman, 2008; Green et al., 2008; Penn et al., 2008; 57 
Pinkham et al., 2003; Savla et al., 2012); and that these impact on illness outcomes (Couture et 58 
al., 2006; Fett et al., 2011; Penn et al., 1996). Social dysfunctions are also reflected in some of the 59 
key symptoms of the disorder, such as paranoia, social withdrawal and lack of (social) motivation 60 
(Penn et al., 2008). In daily life, social interactions pose a challenge for patients (Billeke and 61 
Aboitiz, 2013; Couture et al., 2006; Penn et al., 1996), reflected in patients’ difficulties 62 
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maintaining relationships with family or friends (Burns and Patrick, 2007; Pinkham and Penn, 63 
2006). Studies using neuro-economic exchange games, to examine social interactions directly, 64 
demonstrated that patients tend to show lower levels of trust towards others (i.e. cooperate 65 
less), compared to healthy individuals, and are less likely reciprocate in interactions (Fett et al., 66 
2016; Fett et al., 2012; Gromann et al., 2013). Lower levels of trust were associated with more 67 
severe psychotic symptoms in chronic psychosis (Fett et al., 2012; Gromann et al., 2013). 68 
Moreover, in these pair-wise interactions, patients did not adjust their behaviour after receiving 69 
information about the other player’s trustworthiness (Fett et al., 2012), suggesting lower 70 
sensitivity to social feedback, which is in line with earlier data showing that patients are less 71 
sensitive to interpersonal cues (Corrigan and Green, 1993; Johannsen, 1961). While these two-72 
person games can help to enhance the understanding of the dynamic nature of pairwise 73 
interactions, modelling social dilemmas in groups provides additional information because social 74 
interactions often occur among more than two individuals simultaneously (Archetti and 75 
Scheuring, 2012) and the signals of more people need to be interpreted simultaneously leading 76 
to a greater complexity in the social dynamics (Brandt et al., 2003; Sigmund, 2007). 77 
One approach to examine group dynamics during cooperation and sensitivity to feedback 78 
from others is offered by the public goods game (PGG). In this paradigm, a social dilemma is 79 
given: participants have to make a choice between maximizing the benefits across a group at a 80 
cost to their personal payoff, or maximizing their personal payoff at the expense of the group. 81 
Players are given an initial endowment and have to make the decision whether to invest the 82 
money in a group account (cooperating/public good) for mutual benefit or whether to keep the 83 
money for themselves (defecting/private good) yet still benefit from the others contributions. If 84 
a player chooses the private good, his return exceeds that of the players who invested into the 85 
public good (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004); this represents “free riding” (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; 86 
Wischniewski et al., 2009). When players are allowed to punish those who free ride, investments 87 
in the public good increase as cooperation is socially enforced (Brandt et al., 2003; Fehr and 88 
Gächter, 1999, 2002). While fining another player is mostly done out of anger or spite, there is a 89 
cost attached to this - players have to pay to punish a defecting player, which makes this an 90 
altruistic act, a form of punishment at a personal cost (Brandt et al., 2003; Seymour et al., 2007). 91 
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To date, only one study has used the PGG to investigate group interactions in 92 
schizophrenia (Chung et al., 2013). They found higher levels of cooperation in patients compared 93 
to controls in a PGG without punishment (i.e. not examining social feedback). The authors 94 
concluded that patients played the game in a non-strategic way and demonstrate a reduced 95 
sensitivity to loss. However, the authors manipulated the utilized game to have 2 possible 96 
outcomes, group success or failure (success if 3 or more out of the 5 players in the game 97 
cooperated, otherwise failure), which enforced a higher rate of cooperation. More importantly, 98 
they did not include changes in cooperation over time. They also had groups exclusively of 99 
patients, which tends to amplify group differences. Therefore, their utilized PGG did not tap into 100 
the same processes as the PGG design in the current study. 101 
We describe the first study to use a neuro-economic group interaction game to 102 
investigate behaviour in social groups in schizophrenia, using the PGG, incorporating a measure 103 
of sensitivity to social feedback. We were interested in three key elements: 1) baseline level of 104 
cooperation on the first trial, where participants do not have any information on the other 105 
players’ behaviour, 2) behavioural change over time in response to others’ behaviour, 3) 106 
behavioural change when players were able to punish other players – to investigate whether 107 
cooperation can be enforced and to examine sensitivity to social feedback. Based on expected 108 
illness reduced social cooperation, some of the key symptoms of the disorder (e.g. paranoia and 109 
distrust) and previous results from trust game studies we hypothesized that patients with 110 
schizophrenia demonstrate: a) lower levels of baseline cooperation and lower overall 111 
cooperation in the PGG, b) less sensitivity to social feedback indicated by less difference in 112 
cooperation between conditions (i.e. social enforcement) and less adjustment in behaviour after 113 
being fined in the preceding trial as compared to controls (i.e. sensitivity to social feedback). We 114 
hypothesized a negative association between positive symptoms, cooperation and sensitivity to 115 
social feedback in patients. Positive symptoms are related to social abnormalities, deficits in 116 
social decision making and trust. 117 
 118 
2. Methods 119 
 120 
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2.1 Subjects 121 
Twenty-seven outpatients with schizophrenia and 27 healthy controls were included in the study. 122 
Patients were recruited from the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust and healthy 123 
controls subjects were recruited through local advertising. Demographic information is displayed 124 
in Table 1. Inclusion criteria for all participants were 1) age between 18-55 years old, 2) sufficient 125 
understanding of the English language to successfully perform the task and to understand the 126 
informed consent, 3) no learning disabilities, 4) absence of a neurological condition, 5) no 127 
alcohol/drug dependence within the last six months, 6) absence of a major physical illness or 128 
motor, hearing or speech difficulties. For the schizophrenia group additional inclusion criteria 129 
were 1) a diagnosis of schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder or psychotic disorder according to 130 
the ICD-10 criteria, 2) stable under their current treatment (> 6 weeks). The patients who were 131 
included had the following diagnoses without any comorbidity: 20 schizophrenia, 5 132 
schizoaffective disorder, 1 psychotic disorder, 1 polymorphic psychosis with schizophrenia. 133 
Within the patient group, 85% was treated with atypical antipsychotics. 134 
 135 
2.2 Measures 136 
Symptoms - To assess symptom severity in patients the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale 137 
(PANSS) (Kay et al., 1987) was used. The PANSS is a semi-structured interview that assesses 138 
symptoms over a two-week period prior to the testing session. Thirty items are scored to 139 
evaluate the severity of psychopathology: 1 = absent, 2 = minimal, 3 = mild, 4 = moderate, 5 = 140 
moderate to severe, 6 = severe to 7 = extreme. In the current study, the PANSS subscale scores 141 
were used to get an estimate of positive symptom severity (range 7-49) and negative symptom 142 
severity (range 7-49). The positive and negative scale have good concurrent validity and good 143 
internal reliability (respectively Cronbach’s α = 0.62-0.73 and α = 0.83-0.92 (Kay et al., 1987; 144 
Peralta and Cuesta, 1994)).  145 
 146 
2.3 Estimated cognitive ability - To control for possible influence of cognitive ability on group 147 
differences in behaviour in the PGG, an estimation of cognitive ability was assessed with the 148 
vocabulary subtest of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) (Wechsler, 1999). 149 
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The Vocabulary subtest has a total of 42 items, where subjects are required to define and 150 
describe the words best to their knowledge. Words are presented orally and visually. The WASI 151 
vocabulary test gives a good estimate of overall intelligence scores, the vocabulary subtest 152 
showing a 0.87 correlation with the full WAIS III (Axelrod, 2002). T-scores were converted to 153 
scaled WASI scores (range 20-80). 154 
 155 
2.4 Experimental design 156 
A binary public goods paradigm was used to investigate cooperation and sensitivity to others’ 157 
social feedback in a group setting. Subjects participated in two three-player games involving one 158 
of two conditions; 20 trials in the no fine and 20 trials in the fine condition. Before the start of 159 
the game, participants were informed that they were playing all 40 trials with the same two 160 
opponents who were participating on computers that were connected via the Internet. In reality, 161 
they were playing computers (player 2 and player 3) that were programmed with stochastic 162 
algorithms that mimicked human choices. The study was coded in Adobe Flash (see (Reimers and 163 
Stewart, 2015), and was adapted from a version of the PGG in which participants genuinely 164 
played against other real player over the internet. As such, plausibility of playing with other real 165 
people was kept high. In the no fine condition, player 2 was programmed to play a tit-for-tat 166 
strategy (see, e.g., (Axelrod, 1980)); meaning player 2 would cooperate on all trials, except 167 
immediately following a trial on which the other two players did not cooperate. Player 3 was 168 
programmed to play a locally self-interested strategy, defecting on all trials. In the fine condition, 169 
players 2 and 3 used the same strategies as in the no fine condition. Both player 2 and 3 170 
cooperated if they were punished in the preceding trial. Player 2 punished any player that 171 
defected on two consecutive trials. Player 3 never punished other players. To make the strategies 172 
used by the virtual players less transparent, players played their dominant strategy 80% of the 173 
time and a random 20% of the time the opposite strategy. 174 
In the no fine condition, participants received an initial endowment of £3. They then had 175 
to make a choice whether to keep the money for themselves (invest in the private good; i.e. free 176 
riding) or to put their £3 in a public good (invest in the public good; i.e. cooperation). They made 177 
this choice before seeing the other players’ decisions. At the end of the trial, the contribution of 178 
7 
 
each player was revealed, and the money contributed by the three players was summed then 179 
doubled and the total amount was divided equally among all players, regardless of whether they 180 
cooperated or not. The next trial started again with £3 for each player.  181 
The fine condition was identical to the no fine condition, however, after participants made 182 
their choice and had been informed about how the other players had invested, they were then 183 
given the option to punish the players who did not cooperate. To punish another player was 184 
costly, since £1 was deducted from their own total amount and £2 was deducted from the total 185 
of the fined player. So, punishing another player was only possible at a cost to themselves. 186 
The task was presented in an animated way, presenting 3 players seated around a table, 187 
the procedure of the game is visually shown in Figure 1. 188 
 189 
2.5 Procedure 190 
All participants were invited to the Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, where 191 
testing took place. Trained MSc level researchers carried out the testing session and a research 192 
nurse administered the PANSS interview. Prior to participation subjects were given written 193 
information about the content of the study and what would be expected from them. It was 194 
emphasized that their participation was voluntary and they had the opportunity to withdraw at 195 
any moment without any consequences. The study was approved by the Bromley Research Ethics 196 
Committee. All participants signed informed consent before testing. 197 
After completing a questionnaire on demographic information, participants played the 198 
PGG (the no fine condition first, followed by the fine condition) on a laptop in a web browser, 199 
which initially showed a loading message and a connecting message for the other players. After 200 
a few connection attempts, the system displayed that all players were connected and the task 201 
was launched. Plausible variable delays (i.e. sampled independently from a uniform distribution 202 
of 5-20 seconds) were used for the responses of the other players, so that they did not necessarily 203 
appear immediately after the participant made a choice. After completing the experimental task 204 
the PANSS interview was conducted. At the end of the session, subjects received an incentive of 205 
£10 for participation in the study. 206 
 207 
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2.6 Statistical analyses 208 
Statistical analyses were performed using STATA version 14 (StataCorp, 2015). We examined 209 
group differences in demographics using t-tests and chi square tests. Logistic regression analyses 210 
were performed to investigate the differences between groups in baseline cooperation 211 
(investment on the first trial) and multilevel mixed effects logistic regression analyses to 212 
investigate the differences between groups in cooperation, changes in cooperation over trials, 213 
punishment (i.e. frequency of fining other players) and social sensitivity to punishment (i.e. 214 
change in behaviour after being fined). Within the patient group the association between 215 
symptoms and cooperation was examined. All analyses took the possible effects of a-priori 216 
confounders (gender and age) into account. The same analyses were run to investigate within 217 
group effects of condition (i.e. no fine and fine) in (baseline) cooperation (i.e. representing social 218 
enforcement). Separate analyses were conducted to investigate group differences within each 219 
condition and the condition effect within each group, as the full model omitted essential 220 
variables due to dichotomous outcome and predictor variables. 221 
 222 
3. Results 223 
 224 
3.1 Demographics 225 
Demographic information and clinical characteristics are shown in Table 1. There were no 226 
significant differences between groups in age and gender. There was a trend towards significant 227 
differences between groups in estimated cognitive ability, with patients having a lower mean 228 
estimated cognitive ability than healthy control subjects. 229 
 230 
3.2 Group differences on baseline and overall cooperation by condition 231 
Task performance per group and condition is shown in Table 2 and are displayed in Figure 2. In 232 
the no fine condition, there was a significant difference in first-trial cooperation between groups 233 
with patients showing lower cooperation, OR = 0.18, 95% CI (0.04; 0.89), p = .04, but no significant 234 
difference in overall cooperation (p = .23). In the fine condition, there was a similar trend effect 235 
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towards a difference in cooperation between groups, OR = 0.20, 95% CI (0.03; 1.19), p = .077, but 236 
overall cooperation throughout the game did not differ (p = .53). 237 
 238 
3.3 Changes in cooperation over trials 239 
PGG performance changes over repeated trials are shown in Figures 3a (no fine condition) and 240 
3b (fine condition). There was a trend towards group differences in change in cooperation over 241 
trials in the no fine condition, as indicated by the interaction between trial number and group, 242 
OR = 1.05, 95% CI (1.00; 1.10), p = .065. Analyses by group showed a significant change in 243 
cooperation in the healthy control group (OR = .94, 95% CI (0.91; 0.97), p < .001), but not in the 244 
patient group (p = .34). 245 
In the fine condition the change in cooperation over time was not different between 246 
groups, as indicated by the non-significant interaction between trial number and group (p = .86). 247 
In the model without the interaction, the main effect of group on cooperation was also non-248 
significant (p = .43), however, there was a significant main effect of change of cooperation over 249 
trials (OR = 0.96, 95% CI (0.94; 0.98), p = .002). 250 
 251 
3.4 Effect of social enforcement on cooperation within groups 252 
Within the healthy control group there was no significant difference in cooperation on the first 253 
trial between conditions, p = 1.00. However, controls showed a significant difference in 254 
cooperation between conditions, with cooperation being higher in the fine than no fine 255 
condition, OR = 1.60, 95% CI (1.22; 2.10), p = .001. 256 
In the patient group, there was no significant difference in baseline cooperation between 257 
conditions, p = .55. Similar to healthy controls, patients showed a significant difference in the 258 
cooperation throughout the game between conditions, with cooperation being higher in the fine 259 
than no fine condition, OR = 1.84, 95% CI (1.39; 2.44), p < .001. 260 
 261 
3.5 Sensitivity to social feedback and punishing behaviour 262 
The likelihood of cooperation after being punished by another player for free riding did not differ 263 
between groups, p = .58, see Table 2 for performance on the PGG. Groups also did not show any 264 
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differences between cooperation after defecting but not being fined by another player (p = .67) 265 
and no differences in cooperation after cooperating in the previous trial (p = .52). Healthy 266 
controls and patients did not differ in the frequency of punishments given to other players, p = 267 
.69. 268 
 269 
3.6 Correlations between (baseline) cooperation and symptoms within the patient group 270 
No significant association between positive and negative symptoms and baseline cooperation 271 
was present in either condition (no fine condition: p = .38 and p = .59, fine condition: p = .57 and 272 
p = .90, respectively). 273 
There was a significant interaction between positive symptoms and change in cooperative 274 
behaviour over trials in the no fine condition (OR = 1.01, 95% CI (1.00; 1.02), p = .05). To examine 275 
the interaction in more detail, we divided the patients into three groups based on the positive 276 
symptom severity (PANSS Group 1; N = 9, M = 12.33, SD = 1.76, PANSS Group 2: N = 7, M = 15.57, 277 
SD = 0.5 and PANSS Group 3: N = 7, M = 21.29, SD = 2.97). These results are plotted in Figure 4, 278 
demonstrating that patients with the most severe positive symptoms (PANSS Group 3) increased 279 
their level of cooperation throughout the game compared to healthy controls and patients in the 280 
PANSS Groups 1 and 2. This interaction effect was not found in the fine condition, p = .95, and 281 
also no main effect of positive symptoms in the model without the interaction (p = .26). 282 
Post hoc analyses showed no significant interaction between negative symptoms and trial 283 
number on the likelihood of cooperation in the no fine condition and the fine condition, 284 
respectively p = .63 and p = .31. There was no main effect of negative symptoms in the no fine 285 
condition (p = .99), nor in the fine condition (p = .51). 286 
 287 
All analyses were repeated with IQ as a covariate in the model. Due to many missing values in IQ, 288 
we used a multiple imputation-based procedure to re-create the individual missing scores. This 289 
yielded slightly different parameter results, however, significance did not change and the 290 
direction of the effect remained the same. 291 
 292 
4. Discussion 293 
 294 
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This study examined cooperation and sensitivity to social enforcement and social feedback in 295 
schizophrenia in a PGG, to measure the dynamics of social group interactions. Our findings on 296 
baseline cooperation show that patients are less cooperative at task onset. However, patients 297 
did not differ from controls in their reaction to social enforcement or sensitivity to social feedback 298 
(i.e. punishment). 299 
Patients have lower initial inclination to cooperate in social groups, as indicated by a lower 300 
level of baseline investments into the public good compared to healthy controls. This finding is 301 
in line with evidence from pairwise interactions, where patients show less basic trust (Fett et al., 302 
2012; Gromann et al., 2013). To engage in social interactions, one has to trust the other person’s 303 
willingness to cooperate, which seems to be a key precursor in the development of cooperation 304 
in a public goods dilemma (De Cremer, 1999). Patients may choose more selfishly in a PGG 305 
compared to healthy controls, because they are less trusting due to negative beliefs about other 306 
individuals. Another possible explanation is that patients with schizophrenia are more self-307 
oriented, due to a reduced ability to take the perspective of others (Sprong et al., 2007). 308 
Change in behaviour over trials was different between groups in the condition without 309 
fining, but not in the condition where cooperation was socially enforced. Healthy controls started 310 
out with high levels of cooperation and then decreased their cooperation over trials, which is in 311 
line with previous findings on cooperation in a public goods paradigm, cooperation in multi-shot 312 
public goods games tends to be high initially and then declines throughout the game (Andreoni, 313 
1988; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Ledyard, 1995). This can be explained 314 
by a game-theoretic view: the allocation of the public good is equal no matter what amount each 315 
individual invests, thus, to maximize one’s own profit, the dominant long-term strategy is to 316 
defect (Andreoni, 1988). A possible explanation for decreasing cooperation could be that 317 
participants are reluctant to invest into the public good because of fear that others are not going 318 
to contribute as well. This is called inequity aversion. In the beginning of the game, healthy 319 
participants may be more willing to take a risk, or are more trusting in others’ good will compared 320 
to patients. However, when their contributions are not routinely reciprocated, this feeling of 321 
inequity overrides the willingness to cooperate (De Cremer, 1999; Kurzban et al., 2001). The 322 
decline may also be related to a self-serving bias (Fischbacher et al., 2001). Patients’ motivation 323 
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to defect may be based on a lack of trust due to fear of uncooperative behaviour of others. 324 
Another possible explanation could be that patients value monetary reward in a different way 325 
than controls do, which could be related to impulsive choices (Heerey et al., 2007) and 326 
amotivation (Fervaha et al., 2013). 327 
Adding the option of punishing another player for free riding increased the likelihood of 328 
cooperation within both groups compared to the condition where fining was not allowed. 329 
Although this is in line with previous findings in healthy subjects, who tend to increase 330 
cooperation when the punishing of free riders is allowed (Brandt et al., 2003; Fehr and Gächter, 331 
2002), this was in contrast to our expectations in the patient group. We anticipated that patients 332 
would be less sensitive to social enforcement by introducing the possibility of fining others, due 333 
to patients’ deficits in processing social information. The findings suggest that patients are 334 
sensitive to social enforcement. Moreover, there was an increase in cooperation after defecting 335 
and being fined for it: in healthy controls from 12.80% to 45.10% and in patients from 13.72% to 336 
44.83%. This change in behaviour was similar in both groups, indicating that patients did not 337 
show the expected reduced sensitivity to social feedback. There is some evidence from other 338 
studies for unimpaired sensitivity to punishment in schizophrenia (Cheng et al., 2012). In pairwise 339 
encounters a reduced sensitivity, i.e. no changes in trust, was shown after providing information 340 
about the trustworthiness of the other player (i.e. top-down processing) (Fett et al., 2012). In our 341 
study patients had to use bottom-up processing to deduct the social information (i.e. learning 342 
trial-to-trial in the game). It might be that problems arise when patients have to use top-down 343 
processing of social information specifically (integration of a priori information) and not when 344 
patients use bottom-up processing of social feedback that is data-driven. However, it must be 345 
considered that the trust game and the PGG are not identical games and may have different 346 
underlying cognitive motivations, although a key variable underlying cooperation in the PGG is 347 
trust (Balliet and Van Lange, 2013). 348 
Patients and controls demonstrated the same amount of punishing behaviour, which is in 349 
line with results from pairwise interactions in dictator game with punishments (Wischniewski and 350 
Brüne, 2011). These findings suggest that patients are sensitive to social rules and willing to 351 
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altruistically punish other players to reinforce social norms at the same level as healthy control 352 
subjects. 353 
Interestingly, positive symptoms were only associated with the level of cooperation over 354 
trials in the no fine condition. Patients with more severe positive symptoms showed an increase 355 
in cooperation over time, compared to reduced cooperation in the lower symptom groups and 356 
the healthy control group. An inability to estimate the risk of loss (Pedersen et al., 2016; Shurman 357 
et al., 2005) and reduced sensitivity to unfairness (Agay et al., 2008; Csukly et al., 2011) might 358 
explain why patients in the highest symptom group in our study increase their level of 359 
cooperation instead of decreasing this behaviour. It is possible that the higher level of 360 
cooperation in our study is related to making choices without fully contemplating the best 361 
strategy. In accordance with previous studies these abnormalities in behaviour in the PGG may 362 
reflect aberrant reward processing (Juckel et al., 2006a; Juckel et al., 2006b; Nielsen et al., 2012; 363 
Schlagenhauf et al., 2008) and reward learning (Gold et al., 2008; Murray et al., 2008; Strauss et 364 
al., 2014; Waltz et al., 2013). However, this should be interpreted with caution due to the small 365 
sample sizes in the three symptom groups. Nevertheless, the possibility of being punished 366 
resulted in an appropriate behavioural adjustment in patients with more severe positive 367 
symptoms. It is not possible to be definitive about the reason for this aberrant behaviour without 368 
social enforcement, which may be contributed by a lower sensitivity to other people’s choices or 369 
lack of cognitive flexibility. It would therefore be interesting to investigate this association with 370 
specific clusters of symptoms and cooperation in group interactions in future studies. Although 371 
we did not find any associations with negative symptoms, future studies should explore the 372 
association with depressive symptoms specifically, since they have been associated with an 373 
inability to sustain reciprocal cooperation (Clark et al., 2013). 374 
There are some limitations in this study. First, the PGG in this study was a binary 3-player 375 
game, this choice was made for task simplicity (i.e. either an investment in the private or the 376 
public good). However, incorporating continuous investment opportunities may have made the 377 
game even more sensitive to changes in social enforcement and feedback. Second, we did not 378 
counterbalance the two conditions, because of the possibility that a negative belief after being 379 
fined could transfer from the fine to the no fine game. Third, the punishment in our study was 380 
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relatively low; a defecting player punished by a cooperating player would still receive £1 (i.e. £3 381 
from the public good minus £2 as punishment) if the other 2 players cooperated. A flexible level 382 
of punishment could possibly have greater influence on behaviour. Last, we did not differentiate 383 
between medication type, although the majority of patients were on atypical antipsychotics. 384 
Future studies have to systematically investigate the possible roles of medication and stage of 385 
the illness. 386 
This study is the first to investigate cooperation, social enforcement and sensitivity to 387 
social feedback in group interactions in schizophrenia. Although all effect sizes were small, our 388 
findings suggest that patients demonstrate a tendency to initiate social group interactions with 389 
less cooperative behaviour, which may set a negative tone in social settings, potentially 390 
contributing to social difficulties in initiating interactions in daily-life functioning. However, the 391 
results clearly suggest that social enforcement and sensitivity to social feedback are intact, which 392 
indicates that it may be possible for patients adjust their social behaviour accordingly during 393 
repeated social group interactions. This may be particularly important for interventions that 394 
target social skills and suggests that group-based interventions may be especially helpful. The 395 
study would benefit from replication, since this is the first study to investigate cooperation and 396 
sensitivity to social feedback in this manner. It would be interesting to extend this work into social 397 
group interactions in real time using neuroimaging, to test the underlying neural mechanisms. 398 
 399 
 400 
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Figure legends 530 
 531 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the binary public goods game: a) no fine condition and a+b) 532 
fine condition; a) participants could cooperate (black arrows) or free ride (light grey arrow), a 533 
choice made without knowing the other players’ decisions. The amount in the public good was 534 
doubled and split equally among all players (grey arrows), b) The players who cooperated could 535 
fine (punish; grey arrows) the players who free rode after receiving information on the other 536 
players’ decisions. Costing the fining player £1, but deducting £2 from the free riding player. 537 
 538 
 539 
Figure 2. Group and condition comparisons for baseline cooperation and overall cooperation in 540 
the multi-round binary public goods game. The error bars depict the dispersion of cooperation 541 
over all trials within groups and conditions. † p < 0.08, * p < .05, ** p <= .001 542 
 543 
 544 
Figure 3: Cooperation per trial in the multi-round binary public goods game in the a) no fine 545 
condition, and the b) fine condition. 546 
 547 
 548 
Figure 4. To visualize the interaction effect found between positive symptoms and change in 549 
cooperation over trials within the patient group, 3 groups for symptom severity were made. 550 
Change of cooperation over trials by positive symptom severity are plotted in the no fine 551 
condition. 552 
 553 
 554 
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Table 1 556 
Demographic and clinical sample characteristics 557 
 Healthy Controls 
(n = 27) 
Mean (SD) 
SZ Patients 
(n = 27) 
Mean (SD) 
Statistics 
 
Age (years; range 22-55) 39.89 (9.22) 40.48 (8.61) t (52) = -0.24, p = .81 
Gender 78% Male 85% Male Χ2(1, N = 54)= 0.49, p = .48 
WASI (range 40-133) 101.85 (18.13; n = 20) 90.92 (19.18; n = 24) t (44) = 1.93, p = .06 
Illness duration (years) - 16.12 (8.79; n = 25) - 
PANSS positive - 16.04 (4.31; n = 23) - 
PANSS negative - 18.30 (5.55; n = 23) - 
 558 
 559 
 560 
Table 2  561 
Performance on the public goods game 562 
 Healthy Controls 
% (n = 27) 
SZ Patients 
% (n = 27) 
No Fine Condition 
First trial cooperation 
Overall cooperation 
 
88.89 
57.22 
 
66.67 * 
50.19  
Fine Condition 
First trial cooperation 
Overall cooperation 
Punishment to others (in trials where fines were allowed) 
Cooperation after defecting and being fined in the previous trial 
Cooperation after defecting and not being fined in the previous trial 
Cooperation after cooperating in the previous trial 
 
88.89 
66.30 
48.54 
45.10  
12.80  
49.12  
 
74.07 † 
61.48  
51.58  
44.83  
13.72  
43.66  
† p < 0.08, * p < .05 563 
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